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Abstract 
Increasing  attention  is  given  in  monitoring  the  management  team  by  the 
shareholders  through  corporate  governance  mechanism.  This  is  to  ensure  that  every 
strategic business decisions maximize shareholders’ wealth. Unlike previous studies which 
identified  a  direct  relationship  between  corporate  governance  mechanism  and 
performance, this study is conducted to examine the moderating impact of the corporate 
governance mechanism on the relationship between innovation investment proxies by R&D 
expenditures and firm performance. Our findings concluded that board compensation and 
frequency  of  board  meeting  are  considered  as  important  characteristics  that  would 
determine the effectiveness of the innovation investment. Thus, in analyzing the innovation 
investment  incurred  by  the  firm,  investors  should  review  the  corporate  governance 
characteristics  as  it  would  determine  the  effectiveness  of  the  innovation  investment  in 
improving firm performance. 
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Rezumat 
O atenţie deosebită este acordată monitorizării echipei de management de către 
acţionari prin mecanismul de guvernanţă corporativă. Aceasta are scopul de a asigura că 
toate deciziile strategice de afaceri vor maximiza averea acţionarilor. Spre deosebire de 
studiile anterioare, care au identificat o relaţie directă între mecanismul de guvernanţă 
corporativă şi performanţă, acest studiu este realizat pentru a examina impactul moderator 
al mecanismului de guvernare corporativă asupra relaţiei dintre investiţiile de inovaţie 
reprezentate  prin  cheltuielile  de  Cercetare  &  Dezvoltare  şi  performanţele  firmei. 
Rezultatele noastre au identificat compensarea bordului de conducere, precum şi frecvenţa 
reuniunii bordului ca fiind caracteristici importante care ar determina eficienţa investiţiei 
de inovaţie. Astfel, în analiza investiţiilor de inovaţie suportate de firmă, investitorii trebuie Management Management Management Management    
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să revizuiască caracteristicile guvernanţei corporative, deoarece astfel ar putea determina 
eficienţa investiţiei de inovaţie în îmbunătăţirea performanţei firmei. 
 
Cuvinte-cheie: guvernanţa corporativă; innovaţie; performanţă 
 
JEL Classification: G34 
 
 
Introduction 
 
gency theory explains the relationship between the principal who is 
the  owner  of  the  economic  resources  and  the  agent  who  is  the 
controller and manager of the resources (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In addition, agency theory was developed based on the assumption that the agents 
have more information than the principals, which caused difficulty to the principals 
in monitoring the agents effectively (Adams, 1994). Thus, due to the advantage of 
having more information on the economic resources, the agents tend to maximize 
their  self-interest  rather  than  the  owners’  wealth.  In  this  connection,  corporate 
governance has been applied by most of organization as a set of mechanisms to 
influence the decisions made by agents when there is a separation of ownership and 
control. By having good corporate governance practices, managerial opportunism 
can be reduced. 
  One of the areas where managerial opportunism can occur is innovation 
investment  described  as  research  and  development  (R&D)  expenditure.  This  is 
because the managers may manipulate R&D investment when there is a conflict of 
interest  between  the  principals  (shareholders)  and  the  agents  (managers)  of  the 
firms.  Shareholders  may  be  interested  to  see  that  the  organization  rigorously 
involves in R&D activities in order to ensure that the firm performance in future 
will  be  improved.  However,  lack  of  experiences  and  time  spent  in  the  R&D 
activities may cause managers to spend the financial resources inefficiently and 
ineffectively. Besides, R&D is one of the significant areas within any corporate 
entity as it could determine the future performance of the firms. Wang and Chang 
(2005) mention that previous studies have found that R&D expenditure is not only 
influence current performance and market value but also future performance. 
  In  relation  R&D  expenditures  in  Malaysia,  the  survey  conducted  by 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation Malaysia indicated that research 
and development (R&D) expenditure has been steadily and consistently growing 
since 1996. The expenditure by private sectors which are the major contributor 
toward  R&D  activities  in  Malaysia  has  increased  by  RM400.5  million,  from 
RM1.63 billion in 2002 to RM2.03 billion in 2004. This phenomenon indicates that 
more and more companies put a greater emphasis on R&D activities. Relying on 
this trend, it is interesting to discover the impact of the R&D investment on the 
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firms’  performance  in  the  existence  of  corporate  governance  monitoring 
mechanism which has not been concluded. 
 
  Literature review 
 
  Innovation investment and firm performance 
Most of the prior studies find that innovation through R&D activity is one 
of  the  factors  that  contribute  to  the  firm  growth  particularly  in  the  high-tech 
industry (Chan, Martin & Kensinger, 1990; Huang and Lin, 2006). This is because 
innovation could improve employee’s productivity and efficiency which lead to 
improvement  in  firm  performance  (Dougherty  &  Hardy,  1996;  Lawless  & 
Anderson, 1996; Li & Deng, 1999). Most previous studies found that there is a 
significant  and  positive  correlation  between  research  and  development  (R&D) 
expenditures and business performance as well as market value. (Huang & Lin, 
2006;  Cockburn  &  Griliches,  1988;  Hall,  1993).  Chauvin  and  Hirschey  (1993) 
conclude that R&D expenditures have consistently significant, positive influences 
on the market value whereby higher R&D expenditures attract higher expectation 
of  future  cash  flow  by  the  investors.  Based  on  these  findings,  the  following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between innovation investments and 
firm performance. 
 
Innovation investment and board size on firm performance 
Earlier studies find there is positive relationship between board size and 
firm performance (Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Sah & 
Stiglitz, 1986; Khanchel, 2007). As explained by Khanchel (2007), the quality of 
corporate governance can be influenced by the size of the board. Cheng (2008) 
finds that the board size could manipulate the innovation investment through R&D 
expenditure which will have an impact on firm performance. As such, larger board 
size tends to be less likely involves with high-risk projects. Following from these 
findings, Hypotheses H2 is proposed: 
H2:  The  positive  association  between  innovation  investments  on  firm 
performance is stronger for firms with larger board size. 
 
Innovation investment and board independence  
on firm performance 
Chung, Wright and Kedia (2002) find that there is significant and positive 
relationship between R&D investments and the firm value but only for firm with 
higher  proportion  of  outside  directors.  Consistent  with  this  finding,  Adam  and 
Mehran (2003) also conclude that firm performance can be improved by improving 
the  proportion  of  outside  directors  since  they  are  more  effective  in  monitoring 
manager  performance.  Coles  et  al  (2007)  suggest  that  the  existence  of  outside 
directors in the board tend to better discipline managerial behavior. As such, it can Management Management Management Management    
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be said that managers are likely to act to maximize shareholders’ wealth rather than 
pursuing personal interest. Based on these findings, the following hypothesis  is 
proposed: 
H3:  The  positive  association  between  innovation  investments  on  firm 
performance is stronger for firms with higher fraction outside directors. 
 
Innovation investment and number of board meeting  
on firm performance 
The effectiveness of the board can be improved by spending more time for 
board  meeting.  Shivdasani  and  Zenner  (2004)  explain  that  where  there  is 
requirement for tight control and supervision, the board should be ready to increase 
the number of meetings frequency. Based on this findings, it can be said that board 
meeting is one the significant methods for the board to discuss on the relevant 
issues in relation to the firm. These findings also suggest that there is a positive 
relationship between board meeting and firm performance. As such, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H4:  The  positive  association  between  innovation  investments  on  firm 
performance is stronger for firms with higher frequency of board meetings. 
 
Innovation investment and CEO duality  
on firm performance 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) find that firms with separate roles consistently 
perform better than firms with combined roles. Consistent with this study, Pi and 
Timme (1993) also find in their study the firms that separate roles of CEO and 
Chairman  shows  higher  Return  on  Assets  and  cost  efficiency  ratios.  Yermack 
(1996) also states that separation of the two functions leads to higher price-to-book 
multiples. These finding shows there are potential positive relationship between 
CEO  duality  and  firm  performance.  Based  on  these  arguments,  the  following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H5:  The  positive  association  between  innovation  investments  on  firm 
performance is stronger for firms with no role duality. 
 
Innovation investment and compensation  
on firm performance 
Most previous studies find that that there is a positive relationship between 
board compensation and firm performance (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2001; Brick, 
Palmon & Wald, 2006; Aggarwal & Samwick, 2006). Brick, Palmon and Wald 
(2006) explain that this could be due to the fact that compensation is a source of 
directors’ motivation for improving firm performance. Kakabadse and Kakabadse 
(2001)  suggest  that  in  order  to  influence  board  of  directors  to  improve  firm 
performance,  firm  need  to  offer  appropriate  compensation.  As  such,  this  study 
proposes the following hypotheses: 
H6:  The  positive  association  between  innovation  investments  on  firm 
performance is stronger for firms with higher board compensation. Management Management Management Management    
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Research design 
 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  the  moderating  impact  of 
corporate  governance  characteristics  on  the  relationship  between  innovation 
investments proxies by R&D expenditure and firm performance. The sample of the 
study consists of non-financial public listed firms listed on MESDAQ, Main Board 
and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia whose annual reports available in 2005. All 
the  finance  related  firms,  bank,  insurance  and  unit  trust  are  excluded  from  the 
sample  due  to  their  differences  in  the  regulatory  requirement  and  financial 
reporting standards and compliance. A final sample of 100 companies is selected 
based on disclosure of the R&D expenditures in their annual reports for 2005. The 
data on the ROA and ROE are collected for 2005 to 2007 in order to compute 
average firm performance. The descriptions of the variables used in this study are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
  Description of variables 
Table 1 
Variables  Acronym  Description 
Dependent 
   
Return of Equity  ROE  Net income/ common stockholders’ equity 
Return on Asset  ROA  Net income/ total assets 
Independent 
   
R&D Expenditure  RnDAsset  R&D expenditure/ total assets 
Moderator 
   
Size of board of 
directors 
Size  Number of directors in the board 
Board independence  Indept_R  Total outside directors / total board 
No. of board meeting  Meet  Number of board meetings held 
CEO Duality  Duality  Indicator of 1 if duality, 0 for separate roles 
CEO Compensation  Compen  Logarithm of compensation for director in 2005 
Control 
   
Firm size  LogAsset  Logarithm of firms total asset 
 
  Model specification 
 
  The following regression equations have been used as the primary model 
to  test  the  hypotheses.  Each  model  will  contain  the  interaction  term  of  R&D 
expenditures  (RnDAsset)  as  a  proxy  for  innovation  investment  and  corporate 
governance  mechanisms.  The  general  model  of  this  study  can  be  described  as 
follows: 
 
Perf = ß0 + ß1RnDAsset + ß2LogAsset+ ß3Size+ß4Indept_R +ß5 Meet +  
+ß6 Duality + ß7 Compen + ß8 Interaction term + Ɛ Management Management Management Management    
 
 
 
 
 
Vol.13, Nr. 2/2010        Economia. Seria Management 
 
230
  The  specific  models  for  each  interaction  term  of  R&D  expenditures 
(RnDAsset) and corporate governance mechanisms are the following: 
 
Perf =  ß0 + ß1RnDAsset + ß2LogAsset+ ß3Size+ß4Indept_R +ß5 Meet +  
+ ß6 Duality + ß7 Compen + ß8RndxSize + Ɛ 
 
Perf = ß0 + ß1RnDAsset + ß2LogAsset+ ß3Size+ß4Indept_R +ß5 Meet +  
+ ß6 Duality + ß7 Compen + ß8RndAssetxIndept_R + Ɛ 
 
Perf = ß0 + ß1RnDAsset + ß2LogAsset+ ß3Size+ß4Indept_R +ß5 Meet +  
+ ß6 Duality + ß7 Compen + ß8RndAssetxMeet + Ɛ 
 
Perf = ß0 + ß1RnDAsset + ß2LogAsset+ ß3Size+ß4Indept_R +ß5 Meet +  
+ ß6 Duality + ß7 Compen + ß8RndAssetxDual + Ɛ 
 
Perf = ß0+ ß1RnDAsset + ß2LogAsset+ ß3Size+ß4Indept_R +ß5 Meet +  
+ ß6 Duality + ß7 Compen + ß8RndAssetxCompen + Ɛ 
where 
 
ß0  = Intercept 
Perf  = Operating Performance measured by Return on Equity (ROE)  
= Operating Performance measured by Return on Assets (ROA) 
RnDAsset   = R&D Expenditures / Total Assets 
LogAsset  = Logarithm of Total assets 
Size   = Board Size 
Indept_R  = Board Independence 
Meet  = Board Meeting  
Duality  = CEO Duality 
Compen  = Board Compensation 
Ɛ   = Error term 
 
The data is analyzed by using SPSS (Statistical Package of Social Science). 
According to Hartmann and Moers (1999:293), moderated regression analysis is 
the  appropriate  statistical  technique  when  the  hypotheses  involve  testing  of 
interaction  term.  The  interaction  effect  is  due  to  the  interaction  of  moderator 
variables  with  the  independent  variable  to  change  the  relationship  between 
independent  and  dependent  variables  (Hair  et  al,  2006).  In  order  to  test  the 
interaction effect, the hierarchical regression technique is used whereby interaction 
term is regressed one by one in order to examine the added value to the explanation 
of the relationship. In this study, the general model is regressed first in order to 
assess the “direct effect” of the independent, moderating and control variables on 
the  relationship  between  innovation  investment  (R&D  expenditure)  and  firm 
performance (ROA and ROE). Next, separate regressions are conducted in order to 
determine  the  effect  of  the  interaction  terms  on  the  relationship  between  R&D 
expenditure and ROA/ROE. Management Management Management Management    
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  Data analysis and empirical results 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
   
  The  descriptive  statistics  summarize  the  data  in  relation  to  dependent 
variables, independent variables, moderator and control variables. The descriptive 
analysis is presented in Table 2. 
 
Summary of descriptive statistics 
Table 2 
  Min  Max  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Return on Equity  -46.43  44.53  3.85  17.73  -0.49  0.14 
Return on Asset    -0.43    0.70  0.02    0.15   0.16  4.91 
R&D per Total Asset     0.00    0.89  0.11    0.16   2.83  9.66 
Log Asset     3.54    7.61  4.82    o.64   1.50  3.84 
Board Size     4.00  13.00  6.96    1.94   0.81  0.44 
Board Independence 
Ratio 
   0.20    0.80  0.37    0.09   1.43  4.07 
Board Meeting     1.00  12.00  4.09    2.31   0.99  2.76 
Compensation     5.00    7.00  5.88    0.48  -0.35  1.09 
N = 100 
In respect of the dependent variables, the minimum ROE is –46.43. This 
indicates that some of the companies within the sample experiencing financial loss 
during the financial year 2005, 2006 and 2007. Similarly, ROA also is showing a 
negative figure for the minimum ROA. As such, this could be due to the similar 
explanation on the ROE.  
In connection with dependent variables, Table 2 shows that some of the 
companies  incurred  very  minimal  expenditures  on  R&D  activities.  Meanwhile, 
some companies spent very huge amount approximately 90% of total assets on 
R&D activities. This could be the companies which highly focus on technological 
advancement. In addition, another explanation is that it could be due the companies 
which at preliminary stage of setting up R&D facilities whereby huge investment is 
required.   
Descriptive statistics for moderating variables are also shown in Table 2. 
First,  the  average  board  size  is  seven  members  with  minimum  of  four  and 
maximum of 14. Even though Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
does not mention the requirement for board size, the board with seven members 
could be considered optimal for most of the firms since it will be more effective on 
the basis of less communication problem as compared to 14 members (Yermack, 
1996). Second, for board independence ratio, the minimum and maximum outside 
directors  are  20%  and  80%  respectively.  On  average  most  of  the  firms  have 
approximately  40%  of  outside  directors.  This  shows  that  most  of  firms  prefer 
internal  directors  even  though  outside  directors  are  considered  better  monitors. 
This  could  be  due  to  the  fact  that  Malaysian  business  owners  prefer  internal 
directors because of coordination and communication easiness apart from the fact Management Management Management Management    
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that family ownership is a prominent in the Malaysian corporate sector. Third, as 
shown  in  Table  2,  the  highest  number  of  board  meetings  conducted  was  12. 
However, on average most of the companies were having four meetings during 
2005.  
Frequency of CEO Duality 
Table 3 
  Frequency  Percent  Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Other   73  73  73  73 
Duality  27  27  27  100 
Total  100  100  100   
 
Based on Table 3, 27% of the companies prefer CEO duality and 73% of 
the companies separate the CEO and board roles. This could be due to the fact that 
most of the companies in Malaysia follow MCCG recommendation that the roles 
should be separated. In addition, it also could be due the effectiveness of board of 
directors  when there  is  a  separation  of  CEO and  board  of  directors  (Vafeas  & 
Theodorou, 1998). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
The regression analysis is firstly conducted to examine the direct effect of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable. As indicated in Table 4, the 
explanatory power, R
2 is 0.23 when using ROE as the dependent variable. Further 
analysis indicates that RnD per Total Asset has a significant negative relationship 
with ROE (p < 0.01). Using ROA as a dependent variable, it shows that the R
2 
increased to 0.37. Similar to earlier test, the regression analysis shows that RnD per 
Total Asset has significant negative relationship (p< 0.05) with ROA.  
    The main objective of the study is to investigate the interaction effect of 
innovation  investment  proxies  by  R&D  expenditure  and  corporate  governance 
characteristics on firm performance. Based on Table 4 and 5, it shows that the 
interaction of board size is not significant. As such, it can be concluded that board 
size  does  not  have  moderating  impact  on  the  relationship  between  R&D 
expenditures and; ROA and ROE. Thus, this result does not support hypothesis H2. 
Analysis  was  also  carried  to  evaluate  the  interaction  effect  of  board 
independence on the relationship between R&D expenditures and ROE and ROA. 
Consistent  with  the  earlier  results,  Table  4  and  5  again  show  that  there  is 
insignificant  effect.  As  such,  board  independence  does  not  moderate  the 
relationship between R&D expenditures and ROE and ROA. This means that H3 is 
not  supported. This implies that  board  independence  does  not  have moderating 
effect on the relationship between innovation investment and firm performance. Management Management Management Management    
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Hierarchical Regression Examining R&D Expenditure,  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and ROE 
Table 4 
 
 
The interaction term of board meeting is also included in the regression 
analysis.  Using  ROA  as  a  proxy  for  performance  indicates  that  there  is 
insignificant effect. However, the result in Table 5 shows that there is a significant 
positive effect (p < 0.1) between R&D expenditures and ROE. Therefore, board 
meeting moderates the relationship between innovation investments and ROE. As 
such, H4 is partially supported. 
 Management Management Management Management    
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Hierarchical Regression Examining R&D Expenditure,  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and ROA 
Table 5 
 
 
  The interaction effect of CEO duality is also assessed and the results are 
shown in Table 4 and 5. It proves that the relationship is not significant which 
means  that  CEO  duality  does  not  have  moderating  impact  on  the  relationship 
between innovation investment and firm performance. As such, H5 (a) and H5 (b) 
is not supported.  
Finally,  the  analysis  investigates  the  interaction  effect  of  board 
compensation on the relationship between R&D expenditures and; ROA and ROE. 
Based on table 4 and 5, there is a significant positive (p < 0.05) effect which means 
that board compensation moderate the relationship between R&D expenditures and 
both  ROA  and  ROE.  Therefore,  H6  which  stated  that  a  positive  association 
between innovation investments on firm performance is stronger for firms with 
higher board compensation is supported. Management Management Management Management    
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Discussion of findings 
 
This  study  examines  the  moderating  effect  of  corporate  governance 
characteristics  on  the  relationship  between  innovation  investments  and  firm 
performance.  The  result  of  direct  effect  has  indicated  that  there  is  negative 
significant relationship between R&D expenditures and ROE and also with ROA. 
The  inverse  relationship  could  be  due  to  the  fact  that  huge  R&D  expenditure 
reduces  the  firm’s  net  return  for  the  year  that  may  lead  to  inferior  financial 
performance. This finding consistent with the earlier study conducted by Chen, 
(Cheng  &  Hwang,  2005).  In  addition,  this  finding  may  also  suggest  that 
performance period in which the benefits of R&D expenditures should be reflected 
is too short. It may be necessary to look at the performance period which extends 
for more than three years after the R&D expenditures have incurred. This may 
require another study for further investigation.  
The main objective of the study is to investigate the moderating effect of 
corporate  governance  characteristics  on  the  relationship  between  innovation 
investment  proxies by R&D  expenditures and  firm  performance represented  by 
ROE and ROA. Based on the hierarchical regression analysis, interaction effect of 
board  compensation  has  significant  positive  effect  on  the  relationship  between 
R&D expenditure and ROE as well as ROA. This implies that board compensation 
is one of the effective methods to ensure that the R&D projects undertaken by the 
firms would improve firm performance. This is consistent with previous studies 
which also find that firm performance can be improved by providing appropriate 
level  of  incentives  to  the  directors  (Kakabadse  &  Kakabadse,  2001).  This  is 
because compensation is a major source of motivation and encouragement for the 
directors to improve firm performance (Brick, Palmon & Wald, 2002). 
  In addition, the study  also  finds that board meeting also  moderates  the 
relationship between R&D expenditure and ROA. This means that by increasing 
the frequency of meetings, the firm performance can be improved through R&D 
projects. Basically, this finding is consistent with previous studies i.e. Shivdasani 
& Zenner, 2004. The reasonable explanation is that by increasing the frequency of 
board meeting, the evaluation of R&D projects may be carried out more thoroughly 
and comprehensively. As a result, only projects that could have positive return to 
the  firm  will  only  be  selected.  Consequently,  this  would  result  in  better  firm 
performance.  In  addition,  by  meeting  more  frequently,  board  would  be  able  to 
monitor  and  supervise  the  progress  of  any  R&D  projects.  As  such,  necessary 
actions can be taken on the R&D projects that are not progressing successfully and 
this will help to improve firm performance. 
  On the  other hand,  the interaction effect  of other  corporate governance 
characteristic such as board size, board independence and CEO duality do not show 
any significant interaction on the relationship between R&D expenditures and firm 
performance. In relation to the interaction effect of board size, the result is not 
supported could be due to the fact that the quality of board members that determine Management Management Management Management    
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the effectiveness of the R&D expenditures rather the board size. This is consistent 
with  previous  study  by  Khanchel  (2007)  who  concludes  size  of  the  board  has 
significant  impact  on  the  quality  of  corporate  governance.  In  addition,  Cheng 
(2008) finds that the board size may affect the performance variability through it 
effect on R&D spending. This is due to the facts that high-risk projects such R&D 
activities are less attractive to the firm with larger board size. 
The result for the interaction effect of board independence ratio on the 
relationship  between  R&D  expenditures  and  firm  performance  is  also  not 
significant. This result is consistent with the prior study conducted by  Le et al 
(2006). The reasonable explanation could be due to the fact the outside directors 
may not be truly independent since they may me under managerial influences (Le 
et  al,  2006).  Managerial  influences  may  due  to  the  existence  of  consulting 
relationships  or  other  business  connections  with  the  firm,  such  as  attorneys, 
investment bankers, business partners, and consultants (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). 
The  interaction  effect  CEO  duality  on  the  relationship  between  R&D 
expenditures and ROE is also not significant. This could be explained on the basis 
that the CEO who is also a chairman of the board will have a concentrated power 
base that will permit the CEO to make decisions in their own-self interest and at 
the  expense  of  shareholders.  This  is  consistent  with  the  previous  study  that 
concludes that the combined structure is inappropriate for the most critical power 
relationships  in  the  firm  (Jensen,  1983).  In  conclusion,  in  analyzing  the  R&D 
expenditures  incurred  by  the  firm,  investors  should  review  the  corporate 
governance  characteristics  as  it  would  determine  the  effectiveness  of  the  R&D 
investment in improving firm performance. Board compensation and frequency of 
board meeting are considered as important characteristics that would determine the 
effectiveness of the R&D investment.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Basically, this study is one of few studies that explicitly investigate the 
moderating  impact  effect  of  corporate  governance  characteristics  on  the 
relationship between R&D expenditures and firm performances. The findings have 
contributed  significantly  to  the  investors  particularly  in  Malaysia  in  relation  to 
R&D  investment  made  by  the  Malaysian  listed  firms.  In  general,  the  finding 
suggests  that  investor  should  consider  the  nature  of  corporate  governance 
characteristics in analyzing the R&D investment made by the firms. As this study 
found, some of the corporate governance mechanism may not be an effective way 
to ensure that the R&D investment undertaken by the firm would improve future 
performance. This study suggests that board compensation packages and frequency 
of board meeting may be able to ensure that R&D investment undertaken by the 
firm would generate positive return in the future. 
Conclusion drawn form this study may be subjected to several limitation 
which  could  be  the  potential  opportunities  for  future  investigation.  First,  other Management Management Management Management    
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variables that could significantly affect the result may have been excluded from the 
study. Second, the sample size may be too small which produces difference results. 
Third, the study was based on three-year performance period which resulted in 
negative relationship between R&D expenditures and firm performance. As such, 
longer performance period should be used as it may produce a different result. 
Fourth, the multiple regression analysis has been used in the study. Other methods 
such as simultaneous equation techniques or appropriate more robust techniques 
should be used in order to test the interaction effect on the relationship.  
It can be suggested that future studies should consider some modification 
to the above study. The modifications can be in term of the length performance 
period  as  well  as  the  R&D  expenditures.  In  addition,  future  research  should 
investigate the interaction effect of other corporate governance mechanism such as 
external  mechanism  on  the  relationship  between  R&D  spending  and  market 
performance as this may provide different perspective to the investors in analyzing 
their investment strategies. 
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